After September 11th by Wedgwood, Ruth




The common sense of shock has lingered since September 11 tho On
that infamous morning, I was flying from New Haven to Washington in a
small plane, and did not know initially why we were suddenly diverted to
the airport in Baltimore. Only on arrival did we learn of the al Qaeda at-
tacks on the World Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon. We
watched the trade center towers collapse, over and over again, on the tele-
vision news broadcast. The sense of dread was unavoidable. The terrorist
career of Osama bin Laden has shown an unremitting ambition over the
last decade, and a gargantuan appetite for violence. In 1999, when I
looked closely at bin Laden's handiwork,l it was apparent that the al
Qaeda chief was seeking a nuclear device. On September 11, 200 I, no
one knew whether this ultimate weapon of mass destruction might already
be in his arsenal. The New York City attacks could have killed 25,000
people or more, had the building evacuations not succeeded, and al
Qaeda's attack on Washington had other targets beyond the Pentagon.
Bin Laden has passed beyond any escalatory threshold, unchecked in his
hostility to the West. With full-throated nihilistic violence, bin Laden
defies the possibility of compromise.
The events have made plain the fragility of any liberal society. The
qualities we take most for granted and cherish most dearly -- such as pri-
vacy and freedom of movement and the diversity of a multi-ethnic society
-- are the very sources of our vulnerability. Economic globalization,
touted as the answer for the next century, has been challenged by a global-
ized skein of cooperating terrorist networks, skilled at moving men,
money, and materiel from region to region, from the Philippines to Af-
ghanistan to Europe and now to North America. AI Qaeda framed its at-
tacks against buildings that stood as symbols of international commerce,
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as if to trumpet the globalization of violence against the more secular view
of a world economy.
Bin Laden and al Qaeda pose unique problems as adversaries. To be
sure, dealing with non-state actors is nothing new for veterans of the
1990's. We watched the ethnic communities in the African Great Lakes
and the Balkans tear their countries apart, and occasionally we applied the
law of war to their activities, through the ad hoc international criminal
tribunals. Yet these communities had programmatic demands. The Bos-
nian Serbs, for example, wanted union with Serbia and contiguous terri-
tory for Republika Srpska. But here we have an adversary who does not
have a set of worldly demands. Holding fast to martyrdom, al Qaeda
members cannot be deterred in an ordinary fashion.
The single-minded violence of al Qaeda is also pernicious because the
network has no other competing interests. States usually have other fish
to fry. States have a territory and population to protect, as well as com-
mercial relationships. But here we face an adversary who really does not
seem to care about earthly things, only about the triumph of an eschato-
logical ideology.
What this means operationally is less clear. We will have occasion to
act multilaterally and rally against terrorism. Some of the older treaty pro-
jects embarked upon by the U.N. are useful in this effort. The terrorism
treaties of the 1970's condemned aircraft hijacking and aircraft bombing
and attacks on diplomats, and then used universal jurisdiction and the idea
of international crimes to encourage their prosecution. The Terrorism
Working Group of the United Nations General Assembly Sixth Committee
has lately produced other useful treaties on the financing of terrorism and
on terrorist bombing. These were initially intended to address the prob-
lems of civil wars such as the fight between the Tamils and Sinhalese in
Sri Lanka, fueled by financial booty from expatriates around the world.
But the treaties have broader application, against the financial networks
that sustain al Qaeda. The U.N. has pressed for these two new conven-
tions, trying to keep fuel away from the fire.
The decentralized structure of al Qaeda is a particular challenge. We
will have to rely in large part on police work to root out its scattered
groups in Europe, Asia, and elsewhere. With the member countries of the
U.N., the G-8, OECD and NATO, we are going to need an active cam-
paign of police work, to unravel the threads and burst the cells of the net-
work.
Bin Laden underestimated American resolve to carry the fight to his
center of gravity in Afghanistan. His second strategic error is in placing
even the Europeans in doubt of their own safety and stability. The planned
attack on the Strasbourg market and the chemical plant explosion in Tou-
louse have frightened the French. The discovery of cells in Milan, Ham-
burg, and elsewhere have shown that Europe's tradition of guarding data
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privacy and reticent police tactics has been exploited by al Qaeda.
Yet our erstwhile European allies became faint of heart in the 1990's
when it came time to counter Saddam Hussein's Iraqi program to develop
weapons of mass destruction. The Europeans have commercial ambitions
in the region and diverse immigrant populations. One hopes for real-time
cooperation in policing, after these earlier defections that served narrower
interests.
The great debate at the moment poses a paradigm choice -- under what
regime of law should we think about and act against al Qaeda? Should we
think of the network in criminal justice terms, as we have throughout the
1990's, or in war and armed conflict terms? Lawyers have a vested inter-
est, some might suppose, in choosing criminal justice. But the law speaks
as loudly in armed conflict as it does in criminal justice. The scope of the
damage caused on September 11th makes the language of war seem apro-
pos, and this has some important consequences.
To intercept al Qaeda's plans for future attacks, it is crucial that we go
beyond retrospective historical reconstruction. Criminal charges look
backwards and include only selected individual offenders for the sake of a
manageable trial. Criminal justice supposes that deterrence is possible. We
need to think about the anticipatory moves that one makes in war. We
need, and have newly obtained, the pooling of information between the
domestic criminal justice agencies and the intelligence agencies. The Pa-
triot Act now allows domestic criminal justice agencies to share with in-
telligence agencies both grand jury information and criminal justice wire-
taps that often yield important information on network plans. 2 The effec-
tive sharing of foreign counterintelligence wiretap information will also be
encouraged. We have resisted both in the past. The thought in the 1970's
in the aftermath of the Church Committee hearings was to segregate intel-
ligence and military matters from the domestic realm. Intelligence agen-
cies could operate only beyond the water's edge. But on a homeland bat-
tlefield, that bright line has faded. When you are fighting a transjurisdic-
tional globalized network, a coastal Maginot line doesn't work. It will
take a network to fight a network. If we have the CIA operating overseas
and the FBI conducting onshore investigations and they cannot marry up
their data, there will be little ability to anticipate the adversary's moves.
Following network activities, foreseeing and disrupting al Qaeda's plans,
involves matching up thousands of pieces of data -- car rental agreements,
hotel leases, student IO's, double endorsements, ambiguous remarks on
wiretaps, surveillances of physical movement -- and this cannot be done
2. See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 200 I, § 203, P. L. 107-56, 115
Stat. 272 (200 I).
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through a single liaison officer in the CIA counter-terrorism center. You
have to have the equivalent of joint terrorist task forces, with intelligence
people and domestic criminal investigators working side by side to recon-
struct in real time the RICO style architecture of these networks. For those
reared in civil libertarian households, where intelligence agencies were to
be confined and exiled overseas, this is a bit of a startle. But in the exigen-
cies of our time, a rank ordering of relative dangers is necessary. In my
own view, it was long overdue to have the sharing provisions of the Pa-
triot Act, and indeed the statute should be further extended to allow some
limited sharing with foreign intelligence officials and with state and local
officials. The right to share also has to be acted upon through a changed
culture in all affected agencies.
We also need to think creatively about the modalities of trial, if we
catch people who are alleged to belong to al Qaeda. In debates after the
attacks, I have had a constructive disagreement with my good friends Pro-
fessor Anne-Marie Slaughter of Harvard and Professor Harold Koh of
Yale. America chose to use full dress civilian trials in the Southern Dis-
trict of New York for the first World Trade Center bombing case in 1993
and the East African embassy bombings in 1998. We obtained convic-
tions, but al Qaeda did not slow down. Now we have to be discerning
about what the structure of ordinary criminal trials may mean for our ef-
forts to interrupt and intercept future al Qaeda plans. In a federal trial, the
government is traditionally expected to have almost open-file discovery.
Any evidence offered against the defendant, even from a highly classified
source, must be presented in open court. The transparency is desirable in
ordinary circumstances, but in the middle of a conflict, the adversary can
read the trial record along with the public. This might argue for putting
criminal justice aside until the conflict is over and detaining combatants as
prisoners of war or unlawful combatants, straight up. In the alternative,
we may take a page out of Justice Jackson's book and adapt the forms of
trial to the situation. We may wish to consider a liberal version of the
military commission, a forum under the law of war used by the Allies in
the Second World War to try war crimes in Europe and the Far East. A
military commission was used for the trial of German saboteurs captured
on Long Island and Florida, German nationals in China, and the Japanese
commander in the Philippines, General Yamashita. These commission
proceedings were approved by the Supreme Court on three separate occa-
sions. 3
A military commission allows two things: some latitude in the admis-
sion of reliable evidence, and some ability to close limited portions of a
3. See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942), Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763
(1950), and In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946).
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trial to avoid the gaze of the adversary. Our sensibility is different from
the 1940's. In the Supreme Court review of habeas corpus petitions from
the commission trials, some justices dissented from perceived deficiencies
of the trials. It will require a sensitive brush to adapt the picture of 1945 to
our own political and philosophical aspirations. But we must keep in
mind that fifty years ago, civil court procedures were also quite different
from our present view. We surely should not educate an adversary about
the engineering stability of skyscrapers or the source of our wiretaps of al
Qaeda operations. In the first World Trade Center trial, the question was
asked whether the Trade Center could withstand certain kinds of shocks to
its system. We all learned, and al Qaeda learned too, that the Trade Center
could withstand the impact of a Boeing 707 jet airplane, but the implica-
tion lingered -- a larger plane might exceed the buildings' engineering
tolerance.
A greater range in admitting evidence for evaluation is consistent with
civilized methods of trial. Both European trials, international trials, and
American bench trials admit reliable forms of hearsay. The European
doctrine of mittelharkeit says that one can admit hearsay, and critically
evaluate its appropriate weight. Eyewitness testimony is preferred, need-
less to say. But even hearsay evidence may be entitled to some weight.
Osama bin Laden is said to have telephoned his mother before September
11th to warn her of the event. Bin Laden's mother surely would not tes-
tify. Yet, say that she told a good friend about the call. In federal district
court the jury would not get to hear of the matter at all, even where the
friend is willing to testify and has no apparent reason to distort. The An-
glo-American system has distrusted the capacity of juries to give appro-
priate weight to varied forms of evidence, but other tribunals would permit
its consideration. The Federal Rules of Evidence are not the only model
of fairness.
Our ability to adapt civilian courts to handle these practical problems is
limited by three decades' constitutionalization of civilian criminal proce-
dure. Beginning in the 1960's, the Supreme Court embarked on a long
project of reforming federal and state criminal procedure, using the due
process clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments as the instrument.
The reforms may be judged a success for ordinary cases. But the use of the
Constitution as a vehicle for change now means there is less sure room to
adapt American civilian trials to these radically changed circumstances.
At a minimum, it would warrant the consideration of the Congress to
judge whether federal district court trials can be adapted to the felt prob-
lems of intelligence protection and wider-ranging admission of available
evidence, within the bounds of our civil constitutional norms. For the
moment, the older venue of military commissions, authorized by the Con-
gress in Title 10 and long serving as the trial venue for war crimes, pro-
vides an alternative forum.
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Apart froni trials, we need to understand the limits of criminal justice as
an alternative to national security decisionmaking, when it comes to plan-
ning our responses. The Washington Post published an extraordinary re-
port on October 3rd in an article by Bart Gellman -- asserting that there
was a bypassed chance to seize Osama bin Laden in 1996.4 The Khartoum
government was reportedly willing to force bin Laden to leave his lair in
Sudan, and hand him over either to America or the Saudis. We did not
push the Saudis to take him captive. We did not try to intercept his air-
plane. Rather, we let bin Laden fly to Afghanistan where he reestablished
his enterprise with the visible results of September lIth. The reason for
this lapse was the misapplication of criminal justice standards. The direc-
tor of the Federal Bureau of Investigation reportedly advised the White
House that there was not yet a fully-formed criminal case against bin
Laden and hence no way to detain him 5 The White House wrongly as-
sumed that criminal justice was the only standard by which one could act
against an adversary, and let bin Laden fly off to Afghanistan where he
was able to operate with impunity 6 But self-defense and military rules of
engagement are different from civilian criminal court. One need not have
trials before self-defense. The National Command Authority does not re-
port to the FBI.
In the 1998 response to the Embassy bombings, the United States used
Tomahawk missiles to attack bin Laden's camp at Khost, Afghanistan,
and a pharmaceutical plant in Khartoum that was believed to have links to
bin Laden and the manufacture of chemical weapons. My colleague Jules
Lobel of the University of Pittsburgh School of Law has argued in debate
that it was improper to use military force until the criminal investigation
was complete and that all justificatory evidence should be made public. 7
In my view, this is a highly impractical standard, when faced with a dan-
gerous foe and continuing threat.
On the military side of things, we have some hard choices. The United
States has the largest military budget in the world - as high as 3.5 percent
of our Gross Domestic Product. The Europeans consistently lag behind -
generally limiting their commitment to international security to amounts
that range from 1.5 to 2 percent. In the debate on United Nations dues,
4. Barton Gellman, U.S. Was Foiled lvlultiple Times in EfJol1s to Capture Bin Laden or
Have Him Killed; Sudan's OfJer to Arrest Militant Fell Through After Saudis Said No,
WASH. POST, Oct. 3,2001, at A 1.
5. The fanner United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, Mary Jo
White, was not infonned about the Sudanese alTer
6. See Ruth Wedgwood, The Law at War: How Osama Slipped Away, NAT'L INT., Jan.
1,2001, at 69.
7. See generally Jules Lobel, The Use of Force to Respond to Terrorist Attacks: The
Bombing o/Sudan and Afghanistan, 24 YALE 1. INT'L L. 537 (1999).
HeinOnline -- 36 New Eng. L. Rev. 731 2001-2002
2002] AFfER SEPTEMBER 11TH 731
American policymakers could not help but notice that we paid the lion's
share of NATO expenses, the deterrent that provides authority to many
U.N. Security Council resolutions.
But even our military might is challenged by the task that we have at
hand. The Pentagon began the current Quadrennial Defense Review ask-
ing how one could both modernize the force, go into space and cyber-
space, and rejuvenate old equipment. The proposition was seriously enter-
tained before September 11th that we might demobilize two active army
divisions, four reserve divisions, a marine expeditionary force, and a car-
rier battle group. The civilian leadership wisely polled the views of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff who argued that the operations tempo of military
personnel was already at the breaking point. With the future that now lies
ahead, with a limited land conflict in Asia, any idea of going below ten
ready divisions is even more questionable. So in .the future, without sig-
nificant increases in spending, what do you give up? Modernization? Go-
ing into space? Or the chance to renew aging equipment? None of these
alternatives is attractive. Liberals and conservatives alike have a duty to
consider that, even with our philosophy of limited government, it may be
necessary to make a substantially higher investment in international secu-
rity over the long term. For many decades the U.S. has been the keystone
in the architecture of deterrence in Asia, the Middle East, and Europe.
This will not change soon.
The American academy and political leadership also have a separate
burden, in particular, a short-term and long-term engagement with Islam.
In my mother's expatriate girlhood, the primary historical event taught in
French schools was the victory of Charles Martel at the Battle of Tours,
beating back the Saracens so they could not pass beyond the Pyrenees,
saving France for Christianity. This was a central event in French
self-identity. Even now the Europeans have not liked to recognize how
intermingled they are and always have been with Islam. The glory of Cor-
dovan Spain was as a center of Islam. The Omayyeds of Spain were not a
peripheral suburb of Middle Eastern Islam, but the powerhouse of Islamic
scholarly thought. Abd ar Rahman the Third made Cordova an intellec-
tual center of Europe for all scholars -- Christian, Jewish and Islamic
alike. 8 The Islamic scholar Averroes was recognized by Thomas Aquinas
as a crucial philosopher in the one truth of God. Yet the embrace between
Islam and the West now seems to have fallen by the side. The fault lies
with both parties, dare I say, but one part of it is the adoption of an almost
truculent closed identity by Europe, as well as the decay of Islamic-Arab
intellectual independence.
8. Maria Rosa Menocai, A Golden Reign ofTolerance, NY. TIMES, Mar. 28,2002, at
A31.
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Europeans uneasily recall the role of the Turks in Central Europe. The
Ottomans were at the gates of Vienna in 1683, and lingered in Budapest
until 1686. The Ottoman Empire was a key actor in the Balkans through-
out the nineteenth century (hence the Serb sobriquet that all Bosnian Mus-
lims are "Turks"). With the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in World War
One, the Allies were inclined to punish Turkey by carving it up, initially
intending to neutralize the Dardanelles, consign the Aegean coastline to
the Greeks and Italians, and leave Turkey as a pastoral upland plateau.
This plan, of course, was countered by the resistance of Mustafa Kamal,
and followed by ethnic bloodletting in the coastal city of Smyrna that pro-
longed Greek-Turkish antipathy long after the exchange of populations
under the Treaty of Lausanne. The antipathy has not yet given way, de-
spite Turkey's charter membership in NATO and its key alliance with the
West in the Cold War. Turkey is a secularized administrative state. It has
resisted Islamist fundamentalism. It has a close military relationship with
Israel. Yet, even now, the self-identity of Europe as Christian marks the
divide, even while individual Muslims have emigrated and make up large
segments of Europe's population. A strange and unhappy resistance to
Turkey's candidacy for the European Union has continued, even while
Cyprus has been proposed for membership. Though there are sharp divi-
sions within the Muslim world, still the example of Europe's inhospitality
strikes home.
A cure for the current antipathy between the West and Islam also de-
pends on Muslim intellectuals and political leaders, both at home and in
Europe. It is startling to see that even after the events of September 11th, a
whole generation of European-Arabs has remained silent. Living and
studying in Europe for decades, nonetheless few have felt able or willing
to take it as their own task to confront the militant brand of Shiite and
Wahabi fundamentalism that so rudely attacks any embrace of modem
civic nationalism or secular culture.
But the divide is our own challenge as well. Rather than seeing the
study of Islam as the recondite specialty of a few scholars such as Bernard
Lewis and Fouad Ajami and an occasional professor of religion, we need
to understand enough to speak in resonant terms to a generation of Arab
students and Turkish students and Persian students. We need to revive the
study of Islam, both its historical engagement with the West, and though it
might be presumptuous to try, the sources and arguments of Islamic theol-
ogy. Our students should be able to speak intelligently about the world
view of militant Islam and its violent account of jihad, as well as the Is-
lamic world view that is more pacific and engaging. Though moderate
Islamic intellectuals may feel intimidated at the moment, even with
greater courage, they need to have a cohort within which to revive a dif-
ferent conversation. They will need the indirect support of the West. And
we also have the duty of speaking directly to the Arab street. We cannot
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leave it to Saudi-funded charities to provide elementary education in Pald-
stan, but rather, need to find a way to provide secular education and scien-
tific education to youngsters in Egypt, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and else-
where, that does not leave them captive to mullahs who are destructive in
their plans.
Some proposed cures remain wishful. Money alone is not the answer,
for Egypt has shared generously in the five billion dollar annual aid pack-
age used to sustain the Camp David accords. The Saudi economy is not as
wealthy as once it was, but Saudi Arabia's oil reserves could provide a
regional Marshall Plan; many Muslim countries share resentment at Saudi
unwillingness to invest in the region. Money alone is not going to change
the governments that are undemocratic, that do not try to develop their
economies, and that do not embrace their disaffected youth through any
other mechanism than sheer repression.
America needs to be hard-headed and act robustly in self-defense, espe-
cially when the stakes are so high. But at the same time, we may address
an intellectual challenge to our cultural institutions and also to foreign
governments. For the sake of our own breadth of view, as well as for
self-protection, we need to understand all the roots of our civilization, not
only within Judaism and Christianity but within Islam as well.
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